



STRATEGIC AND DIMENTION BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA

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ABSTRACT

While ties between China and India have improved in recent years, they continue to swing between periods of warmth and rivalry. The bilateral relationship is complicated by a power imbalance and mixed messages that have led to a fundamental mismatch in the ways in which both governments see the danger. The growth of both nations as global powers has also given them access to new channels of communication, allowing the Sino-Indian relationship to expand beyond its bilateral roots and into the regional sphere. Considering the growth of both nations as trade and resource-consuming powers, the maritime domain is where the "nested security dilemma" is most apparent. This essay traces the development of Sino-Indian ties and then analyzes the effects of this transformation on the evolving strategic geography of Asia and on U.S. strategy toward the region.

Keywords: - India, China, Border, State, Strategies

I. INTRODUCTION

Despite different political systems, China and India are aggressively pursuing economic liberalization for growth. Both the countries tout science and technology, and exports as a basis for their growth. Yet, their strategic paths for economic development are remarkably different. China's strategy is methodical and deliberate, while that of India's is chaotic and opportunistic. This article compares the growth strategies of China and India since they will impact a third of humankind by 2050, influence world-wide job migration, and provide valuable lessons for other developing countries.

China and India, with their two very distinct political systems, are both actively seeking economic liberalization in the name of growth. Both nations attribute their economic success to scientific advancements and international trade. Their plans for economic growth, however, diverge greatly. China's approach is rigorous and calculated, whereas India's is haphazard and reactive. This article contrasts the growth methods of China and India because they will affect one-third of the world's population by 2050, affect the movement of workers throughout the globe, and teach important lessons to other emerging nations. Above the previous two decades, China's GDP has grown at an annual pace of above 10%. China's transition from an agrarian to an industrial economy has been very standard, mirroring trends seen in other industrialized nations including the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. China is deliberately pushing domestic consumption with a tight concentration on exports, and it is also developing important links between its agricultural, industrial, and service sectors.



China's leadership has taken a very hands-on approach to the country's growth. It's possible that the end outcome will be subpar. There may be an escalation in the environmental effect of the growing economic gap between urban and rural areas. Fortunately, China's GDP per capita has surpassed that of India's, which was itself comparable to China's as recently as 1991.

II. REVIEW O LITERATURE

Muhammad basit Ali et al (2015)The purpose of this research is to highlight the role that commerce plays in the ongoing peace talks between Pakistan and India. This research highlights the role that commerce plays in establishing and sustaining peace and security on the Indian subcontinent. The study argues that countries' ability to rely on one another economically fosters peace and that the reciprocal economic advantages of doing so prevent violence between them. In addition, the importance of commerce in resolving territory and border issues between India and Pakistan, as well as in facilitating discussions for a lasting peace between the two countries, has been examined. Thus, it is argued that commerce may play a moderate and beneficial role in easing tensions between the two long-standing foes.

Andrew Small (2015)This chapter opens by remembering the 1996 visit to Pakistan by then-Chinese president Jiang Zemin and the 2008 battle over India's accession into the Nuclear Suppliers Group in order to set the stage for the growth of Chinese strategic thinking concerning the role of Pakistan. It claims that whereas the United States has worked to separate India from Pakistan over the last decade, China has taken the opposite strategy by re-hyphenating the two countries. Since the late 1990s, when nuclear weapons were first introduced in South Asia, Washington and Beijing have worked together to keep the region from erupting into a full-scale conflict. According to Small, this dynamic was on full display during the 1999 Kargil War. China did not back Pakistan in the war; instead, it worked with the United States to help bring an end to the situation by diffusing tensions. China's policy of using Pakistan to balance against India is shown by China's nuclear cooperation with Pakistan despite US and international objections. This is in spite of China's collaboration with the US during times of crisis.

Robert C. Feenstra et al (2015)Here, we outline the methodology and use of real GDP comparisons between nations and across time. There are three ways in which version 8 of the Penn World Table improves upon earlier editions. To begin, we provide a measure of productive capacity via the medium of real GDP on the output side in addition to comparisons of living standards through components of real GDP on the spending side. Second, growth rates are less reactive to changes in the benchmark due to their comparison to prices in various countries over a longer period of time. Third, some information on capital stocks and productivity is presented. The Balassa-Samuelson effect and progress accounting are two examples of explored applications. To wit: (JEL C43, C82, E01, E23, I31, O47)

Thorsten Wojczewski et al (2014)This article explores the potential benefits and drawbacks of the 2004-started bilateral composite discussion by looking into the roots of the ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan. The goal is to provide a theoretically sound analysis of the elements that helped and hindered the bilateral composite discourse process. This article uses the idea of the regional security complex to analyze the competition between the two nuclear powers in South Asia at four different scales: national, regional, interregional, and global. This research reveals that there have been significant shifts on all four



fronts over the last decade or so, and that these shifts have created more conducive circumstances for a peace process. These shifts include, among other things, India's new regional strategy, the effects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the area, and India's expanding military might. However, there are still significant barriers to open communication and a lasting settlement of the dispute between India and Pakistan. These include the military's outsized influence in Pakistan, divergent conceptions of national identity, and the challenged nature of statehood in both countries.

Malik Mudassir Ahmad et al (2016)In this study, experts agree that resolving tensions via commerce between India and Pakistan is crucial. The authors of this research stress the importance of a high level of commerce in preventing conflicts and maintaining peaceful ties between the two nations. The resolution of disputes and the promotion of peace may both result from mutually beneficial commerce. In addition, territorial and border skirmishes and peace settlement, as well as the volume and obstacles of dyadic commerce between India and Pakistan, have been examined. We highlight a wide range of important topics, including trade costs, visas, commercial routes between India and Pakistan, and trade under SAFTA. As a result, it seems reasonable to draw the conclusion that economic factors may play a significant role in bolstering bilateral ties and reducing friction between the parties. The findings and inferences presented here were drawn using a qualitative methodology.

III. THE EVOLVING SINO-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP

The China-India relationship defies easy categorization as either competitive or cooperative. The "India China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity" signed in 2005, the Strategic Economic Dialogue initiated in 2011, and the Border Defense Cooperation Agreement signed in October 2013 are all examples of semi-institutional ties that have helped moderate the competitive dynamic in the bilateral relationship. This adds to prior agreements made in 1993 and 1996 to boost trust between the two parties.

The growing military might of both nations has helped prevent a full-scale conflict from breaking out, while it has also increased the likelihood of skirmishes near the disputed border. Despite being behind China, India is rapidly developing its nuclear capabilities. This includes increasing the range of its ballistic missiles and creating a nuclear triad (which was confirmed by the launch of India's first indigenous nuclear submarine).

The two countries' increasing economic ties have helped keep the peace. India is China's most important commercial relationship in South Asia, whereas China is India's most important trading partner in East Asia. A five-year economic and trade development plan was signed between the two countries during the visits of Chinese President Xi Jinping to India in September 2014 and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to China in May 2015. This plan calls for the construction of industrial parks and the improvement of India's rail network. Xi also promised increased access to Chinese markets for Indian businesses, notably those in the pharmaceutical, agricultural, and IT sectors, where India has a comparative advantage.



IV. BORDER TROUBLES

The unresolved border issue lies at the heart of the mutual distrust that plagues the bilateral relationship. In spite of the special representatives' framework being in existence since 2003 and resulting in the resolution of 17 of China's 23 territorial issues, progress has been slow in the conflict with India. There is no mutual agreement on the precise alignments of the boundary, hence the Line of Actual Control (LAC) dividing the contested territory between India and China has not been delineated. Accidental clashes are more likely to occur since the LAC is now a matter of opinion. And despite certain attempts at rapprochement, such the opening of border commerce at the Nathu La, Lipu-Lekh, and Shipki La passes, it appears that both sides are strengthening their stances along the border. As a result, there has been an increase in violations along the Sino-Indian boundary in all three sectors: the western (Ladakh), the middle (Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh), and the eastern (Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh). This was evidenced by the unrest in the Depsang Valley in eastern Ladakh in April 2013 and again in the Chumur region of Ladakh in September 2014.

V. CONFLICTING SIGNALING

Governments on both sides have been sending messages that seem to contradict one another, demonstrating the growing complexity of the bilateral relationship. The rise to power of strong and decisive leaders like China's Xi Jinping and India's Narendra Modi has set the ground for an aggressive showdown in international relations. The Indian state of Gujarat, led by Chief Minister Narendra Modi, has been lauded for its rapid economic growth and development in recent years. Modi is widely credited with laying the groundwork for the state's current success. This suggests a stronger bond of mutual aid and interdependence. The Indian capital of New Delhi still dislikes any concerted effort to unite against China. India's relationship with China is important to Modi, as seen by his decision to travel there before the end of his first year in office. Vijay Kumar Singh, a retired four-star general in the Indian Army, was appointed by Modi as minister of state for the North East Region (bordering China), while Ajit Doval, a former Indian intelligence officer, was appointed by Modi as national security advisor and special representative on the India-China boundary negotiations. This was demonstrated in May 2014 when Modi invited Lobsang Sangay, prime minister of the Tibetan government in exile, to attend Modi's inauguration.

VI. CONCLUSION

Due to their respective strategic importance in the area, China and India's bilateral relationship has often served as a microcosm of regional dynamics and a forerunner of regional structure. Colonial tensions dominated China and India's relationship throughout the colonial era, when Indian opium and soldiers were utilized to conquer Chinese markets and put down domestic uprisings. Postcolonial initiatives like the 1947 Asian Relations Conference and the "Bandung spirit" of 1955, which paved the way for the Non-Aligned Movement and the Asia-Africa Summit, helped cement the initial warmth in relations between China and India. Not only did the Panchsheel Agreement, or the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, serve as a symbol of friendship between the world's two most populous countries, but it also codified the process of interaction within the developing world and became an antecedent to subsequent norms of regional interaction, like the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation between the Association of



Southeast Asian Nations. Finally, the regional architecture fractured along the Cold War division as tensions between China and India grew. To paraphrase what Menon writes, "if Asia's two largest nations were in discord, panAsian concord was a pipedream," and the 1962 Sino-Indian war did just that.

While India has achieved great strides, a sizable portion of the population still has reason to see the glass as "half-empty," despite the country's overall growth. In India, only the well-educated and those living in major cities have been able to reap the benefits of the SITS industry. China, on the other hand, has achieved a more solid and balanced development pattern than India thanks to its emphasis on manufacturing, and it has provided job possibilities to integrate its massive agricultural labor into the industrial sector.

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