

## **MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: LEGAL AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES IN INDIA.**

**Dr. Sonali J Gaikwad**

Assistant Professor in Law, DGB  
Dayanand Law College, Solapur, Maharashtra

### **Abstract**

*In addition to outlining sound policy principles for organisations and their management engaging in cross-border investment or acquisition, this article's goal is to research, evaluate, and summarise a number of Indian institutional legislation pertaining to M&A. Also, from 2004 to 2013, the article provides an analysis of the market value of India's inbound and outbound agreements with international countries.. The following studies have led to a number of significant conclusions, one of which is that businesses who were preparing to acquire higher-valuation inbound acquisitions have typically failed or had delays as a result of such preparation. Through the liberalisation of investment regulations and the provision of a wide range of tax benefits to foreign investors, the newly formed administration is concentrating its efforts on reaching the high investment boom among both established and emerging nations. We expect that policy officials, mergers and acquisitions consultants, attorneys, investment bankers, private equity companies, and multinational corporations that are seeking to invest in India Ltd. would find this document to be helpful.*

**Keywords:** Foreign Direct Investment, Mergers and Acquisitions, Financial Legislation, India, International Business, Takeovers, And Emerging Markets.

### **Introduction**

The world in the 1980s was characterized by changes in economic liberalization, and constantly growing financial liberalization and national integration carried out by the developed countries and exerting influence on the formation of Development Strategy of Countries with Developing Economies in the 1980s. These reforms resulted in significant increase in the internationalization of trade and capital, in the reserves of foreign currencies, in technology, and in the local enterprise. According to Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010) and Cheng et al. (2007), the majority of developing economies, particularly those in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, prioritised healthcare, education, capital markets, consumption, regulation, as well the growth of institutions and entrepreneurs. The loosening of FDI regulations has caused a change in the direction of investment, with funds moving from established to developing economies. This has facilitated the business enterprises to penetrate wider markets with several products and service delivery (Alguacil et al. , 2011; OECD, 2009). Globalization has seen some new economy becoming key players in the global economy some of which include Brazil RUSSIA INDONESIA CHINA AND SOUTH AFRICA popularly known as Bric's. For instance, both these markets' production totaled, was 38% of the world GDP in 2010, significantly up from 1990 (Dhanaraj & Khanna, 2011). UNCTAD estimates that by 2010, total international direct investment was approximately US\$1,244 billion, with a large chunk going to emerging economy fast growers (UNCTAD, 2013).



In this context it is partly seen a positive change in the M&A environment in India due to liberalization in the policies. Consequently, this paper undertakes an analysis of the institutional laws of M&A in India, assesses the market environment of foreign deals, and provides guides on how to improve the investment environment. The 1997 Asian financial crisis was a litmus test for the region's economic resilience (Tan and Hooy, 2003), and the subsequent securities market crash of 2000 marked the IT bubble's bursting point. Companies in the area responded to these crises by using a variety of inorganic business strategies, such as mergers and acquisitions (Reddy et al., 2013). There has been a dramatic increase in cross-border investments, according to the most recent global investment report, and these funds are increasingly flowing from developing to established economies. During the post-2007–2008 global financial synchronisation, there was a noticeable upswing and downswing in asset valuation, with host nations offering more favourable investment and tax policies and home countries' institutional characteristics limiting incoming foreign investment (Reddy et al., 2014b).

While the New Industrial Policy-Reform of 1991 is considered, mergers, takeovers, and other forms of restructuring did not emerge in India until the 1980s and early 1990s (Ahluwalia, 2002; Ray, 2010). The shift in industry regulation prompted a flurry of activity in this area (Agarwal & Bhattacharjea, 2006). After 1994, a tidal wave of mergers hit, prompting regulatory bodies to reach out for a new takeover law (Reddy et al., 2011, 2013). The company's focus shifted from back-end to front-end procedures, which sparked more consolidation efforts. Indian MNEs saw mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as a strategic business move to achieve operational and economic synergies in response to the increasingly competitive global market. The frequency of outbound mergers and acquisitions (M&A) from India increased significantly between 2000 and 2007, according to Varma (2011).

Capital mobility via incoming transactions has been low in mainland India compared to outbound agreements, according to a trend of the value of global inbound and outbound deals representing India in US dollars from 2004 to 2013. Regardless, outbound agreements grew rapidly between 2007 and 2010 as a result of the global financial crisis and the recession in the European financial district. Despite an uptick in inbound transactions in 2010, outbound trades started falling again after 2011. This suggests that Indian MNCs slowed down their acquisition activity after 2010 after having invested in other nations during the economic crisis when asset values were low and attractive. However, multinational corporations from outside started pouring money into India in 2011. Changes to foreign investment policies, like the new companies bill, incentives, and subsidies, are indicators that countries like India, which are developing rapidly, are attracting more investment.

Not long ago, the Indian tax and advisory firm Grant Thornton disclosed that the aggregate values involved in M&A and private equity business reached US\$32. During January up to August-2014 the total mobile money transaction were recorded to be US \$ 6 billion (762 transactions) which is higher compared to US \$ 27 billion (614 transactions) as a result of enhancement on legal and political framework (Economic Times,



2014b). All in all, a scrutinization of the number of bargain and value also clearly reveals that they are on the rise in the current fiscal period compared to the previous years specifically due to relaxation in the acquisition procedure as a motivation for inbound bargain.

### **Institutional and M&A Laws in India**

Many Indian sovereign bodies monitor the regulations and statutes pertaining to mergers and acquisitions. Indian government agencies that fall under this category include the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB), the Income Tax Act of 1961 (Department of Revenue), and the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) (Regulation 1997). Numerous laws and treaties regulate the topic of investment agreements, both domestically and abroad. This category of legislation includes, among other things, statutes enacted in 1882, 1899, 1908, 1962, and 1999 pertaining to customs, property transfers, registration, and foreign exchange management. A number of regulations are supposedly the responsibility of the Department of Revenue, which is part of the Ministry of Finance (Reddy et al., 2014a). The laws and the bodies tasked with enforcing them follow, in decreasing priority.

### **Companies Act, 1956**

It is the legislation that controls M&A activities in India according to the legal criteria, but the Companies Act, 1956 mostly regulates the procedural components of M&A. However, the Act does not provide a clear definition of a merger or acquisition. Sections 390–396 and "amalgamation" make use of the poorly defined terms "compromise," "arrangement," and "reconstruction" (Ray, 2010).

As an example, no combined entity may be financially objectionable or in the winding-up procedure according to Section 390(a). According to the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, there are a number of rules that deal with the legal aspects of amalgamation processes. Specifically:

- Section 391: Gives the High Court (of the place of the company's registered office) the power to approve a 'compromise' or 'arrangement' between a company and its creditors.
- Section 392: The court can then order and/or supervise such compromises or arrangements.
- Section 394: Governs the procedure for reconstruction and amalgamation of the business concerns through applications to the court.
- Section 395: Looks at transactions involving shares from shareholders who do not support a scheme or a contract that has received the backing of the shareholders.
- Section 396: Provides authority to the government to order amalgamations which are most suitable to the nation's interest (Shroff and Ambast, 2013, pp. 89-90). It does not elaborate on the practical loopholes in the application of the Act in mergers involving a —sick industrial company which may be the acquirer or the target. Moreover, Sections 108A-108F require that anyone seeking to acquire shares in an issued share capital of a company integrates the company in the central government business, and this integration is obligatory where the acquisition by the individual, firm, or corporation seeks to go above a prescribed value (Shroff and Ambast, 2013).



Subsequently in 2005, the Irani Committee which was headed by J. J. Irani, the Director of Tata Sons Ltd suggested some changes to the Act; The recommendations for changes in the Act also stressed on the creation of a single mechanism for the approval of mergers within a stipulated time frame. The Companies Bill-2012 brought several changes such as a need for prior approval in mergers and acquisitions and simple procedure to acquire an organization which is a takeover target (Shroff and Ambast, 2013).

### **Competition Act, 2002**

The Competition Act of 2002 deals with several types of business combinations, including mergers, alliances, and product acquisitions. Articles 5 and 6 of Part II of the Act mainly deal with such deals. Section 6 makes it illegal for companies or individuals to form a merger that significantly affects competition in any Indian market (Jain, 2012; Ray, 2010; Sansom and Christian, 2010).

In the past, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act, 1969 governed the handling of cases involving monopoly and completion. Unfortunately, the MRTP Act did not yet include any measures to address anti-competitive practices that occurred outside of India but were nonetheless harming the Indian market (Jain, 2012). Subsequent to the MRTP Act in 2003 came the Competition Act, which established the Competition Commission of India (CCI) to oversee competition regulation. In cases involving anti-competitive agreements, abuse of power, combination, or advocacy, this legislation offers a solution. An acquisition or merger is considered a "control" if the combined assets or turnover of the target business beyond certain criteria. The 2007 changes also changed the combination requirements to either Rs. 15,000 million (about US\$375 million) in India or Rs. 5,000 million (about US\$125 million) in the US. It is still necessary to notify the Indian government of a domestic firm's intention to merge with another company if the combined value of their Indian assets and revenues exceeds INR 200 crores (Bhattacharjea, 2008). Reduced review time from 210 days to 180 days by the CCI and longer processing times for Section 394 rulings by the High Court might delay merger procedures and cause regulatory discrepancies (Shroff and Ambast, 2013, p. 97). When it comes to anti-competitive measures, the Act's provisions are well-written and crafted. However, when it comes to definitions and interpretation, the Act is severely lacking. There is no need for CCI clearance for modifications made with foreign parties that would have little or no impact on India, but new changes need fundamental and substantive evaluations (Economic Times, 2014a).

### **The Regulations, 1997 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI)**

Mergers, alliances, and acquisitions of products and services are among the many types of corporate restructuring that are governed by the Competition Act of 2002. For takeovers and large acquisitions of shares in India, see to Sections 5 and 6 of Chapter II of The SEBI (SAS&T) legislation, 1997, which are both effective and simple legislation. Clauses 40A and 40B of the SEBI listing agreement governed takeover operations prior to this. Justice P.N. Bhagawati presided over a committee that examined the rules put in place under Section 30 of the SEBI Act,



1992. The final product was the SEBI (SAS&T) Regulations, 1997, which set the bar for takeovers. To recommend changes, SEBI formed a new committee in 2009, with C. Achuthan at the helm. The New Takeover Code 2011 superseded the code from 1997, reflecting the changing practices of the time. Despite the lack of a clear definition, a "takeover" occurs when one party acquires a large number of shares or voting rights in order to gain control or management of another company. The 1997 code saw about 23 revisions throughout its thirteen years of life, according to Reddy et al. (2011).

### **Recommendations for Economic System**

Scholars have long called for financial and economic reforms of the second generation to help the economy stabilise and encourage domestic businesses to expand abroad (Pandey, 2012). The government should prioritise changes that address foreign investment limitations, private equity regulations, mergers involving investment banks, rural banking to increase household savings rates, and foreign direct investment (FDI) in agriculture to ensure the safety of the country's food supply. By reducing tariffs, removing quantitative limits, granting tax holidays, and subsidising the establishment of state-of-the-art research and development facilities, India might entice technologically superior multinational corporations to set up shop in the country.

To control the inclination towards bribery and corruption by incentives and sanctions, substantial efforts are necessary, and political leadership has a heavy burden in implementing these changes. Investment in new sectors like education, retail, and other product manufacturers is likely to result from more economic liberty and decision-making freedom. There must be more Investment Banking operation that should be allowed by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The increase in these ideologies would enhance the boost in bank deposits and investment on development of startups and other large scale ventures such as construction of infrastructure. The above objectives should be accomplished through promoting bank mergers especially the horizontal and vertical ones. Some of these changes required in the present merger guidelines by RBI, CCI and SEBI are as follows. Moreover, SEBI and CCI should also implement the principles in the valuation and deal disclosure in finance, accounting and the legal rules associated with capital markets.

Thus, if RBI forms a special bench with CCI, SEBI and concerned ministries, it could well enhance the sovereign gains by quick disposal of both, the domestic and cross border mergers. An economy's success generally results from the ability of the government in administration and implementation of policies than in formulation of policy. Hence, in terms of its external environment India needs to concentrate on the elements of public administration such as skill development.

Banking and financial products and services must cover the civil society and enhance on the saving and investment front. This would let the nation depend on its financial assets, rather than on international loans and debts, thus helping to progressively improve the flows and conditions of financial markets for internal as well as international companies.



## **Recommendations for Business Managers**

This research offers valuable information for multinational managers involved in acquiring and evaluating businesses on a global and national scale. In light of the aforementioned, a number of Indian transactions brought attention to the impact of institutional distance on global M&A, especially in emerging markets. Acquisitions and foreign direct investments do poorly in nations where government interference in politics and governance, weak investor protections, and loose financial market rules are commonplace. Merger and acquisition completion times may vary widely depending on factors such as the nature of the ruling party, the actions of public officials, and the rigour of legal enforcement. Examples include the prevalence of state-owned firms (SOEs) in many industries, the prevalence of high-valuation agreements that need cash payments, and the frequent failure or delay experienced by acquiring corporations from industrialised countries (Reddy et al., 2014a). As the time required to secure required government clearances increases, so do the acquisition transaction expenses. Managers of MNCs must become well-versed in the host country's financial and economic policies, administration, political atmosphere, and institutions. Establishing contacts and networks with project consultants may provide a more thorough grasp of the business environment, rather than just depending on merger and acquisition counsel businesses like investment banks and legal consultants. Acquisition of businesses requires familiarity with foreign investment and venture tax incentives, regulations, and legal frameworks (Barbopoulos et al., 2012; Erel et al., 2012; Zhang and He, 2014). It is important for managers to be informed on the local political climate, government regulations, bureaucratic processes, ties between home and host countries, trade agreements, and the global business landscape as a whole. Successfully managing the legal environment and addressing institutional difficulties need knowledge of these variables. Corruption and bribery have a negative impact on management choices on foreign strategy. According to Schälhammer and Nigh (1984, 1986), lobbying and politicking have a substantial impact on the venture choices and long-term plans of multinational corporations. To get across cultural and institutional barriers in underdeveloped countries, businesses should plan how to get from application to approval. In nations where the government exerts a great deal of control, where political involvement is common, and where financial markets are weak, businesses might benefit by forming strategic alliances, joint ventures, or other non-equity market entrance mechanisms (Scott, 2015). Those taking part in an acquisition abroad for the first time would do well to familiarise themselves with the host country's international relations, economic performance, and institutional features (McConnell, 2014). Before a merger, managers should carefully consider all of the relevant factors, including the deal's structure, payment choices, due diligence, and integration after the merger. Mergers that work in international organisations are the product of well-informed judgements made by managers at various levels.



---

## **Prospects for Businesses and Society**

On both businesses and society as a whole, mergers and acquisitions have far-reaching consequences. International mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have the potential to impact the host country's human rights, particularly those of workers, women, and the host country's economy (Kim & Trumbore, 2010). This is especially true in developing economies. The magnitude of this effect is often proportional to the revenue at a given time. Governments may seek out foreign investment to improve the performance of failing sectors such as higher education, healthcare equipment, rural healthcare, and agricultural equipment.

Governments may authorise a certain amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) via mergers and acquisitions in order to bolster small-scale enterprises, provide new employment opportunities, and protect current ones. This has the potential to boost these sectors' efficiency, which would increase their impact on the national economy. Businesses and society both stand to gain from well-crafted laws and regulations that make doing business simpler and that boost employment and social security. This, thus, encourages business owners to take risks in the market.

As mentioned earlier, the regulatory and legal environment is only one factor that affects the ease of doing business; the activities of the governing party and the conduct of government officials also play a role. For this reason, governments must put in place strong legal frameworks and effective controls. All things considered, this will boost the country's standing in international commerce and make it more competitive.

## **Conclusions**

Recent studies in sociology, global business, finance, and strategy have shown that macroeconomic factors—which include monetary, regulatory, social, cultural, and local elements—substantially impact foreign and domestic investment, trade, and corporate decisions. In our research on corporate control measures, we looked at the institutional regulations in India that govern mergers and acquisitions, international agreements, and takeovers.

The newly elected administration has relaxed investment regulations and introduced tax holidays to entice investment from both established and developing markets in an effort to address these concerns. The paper suggests a set of regulations for enhancing the underlying institutional structure to entice FDI via acquisitions. The intended readers of these recommendations include political figures, economists, law professors, investment bankers, private equity firms, multinational management, and foreign investors interested in funding Indian businesses. Notably absent from this research is information about the characteristics and return on investment of acquisitions undertaken in India by both domestic and international firms. More studies are required to close this information gap and inform business and government strategies in this area.



## References

1. Agarwal, M., & Bhattacharjea, A. (2006). Mergers in India: a response to regulatory shocks. *Emerging Markets Finance and Trade*, 42(3), 46-65.
2. Ahluwalia, M. S. (2002). Economic reforms in India since 1991: has gradualism worked? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 16(3), 67-88.
3. Akbulut, M. E., & Matsusaka, J. G. (2010). 50+ years of diversification announcements. *Financial Review*, 45(2), 231-262.
4. Alguacil, M., Cuadros, A., & Orts, V. (2011). Inward FDI and growth: the role of macroeconomic and institutional environment. *Journal of Policy Modeling*, 33(3), 481-496.
5. Armour, J., & Lele, P. (2008). Law, finance, and politics: the case of India. *Working paper no. 107/2008, European Corporate Governance Institute*.
6. Athreye, S., & Kapur, S. (2009). Introduction: the internationalization of Chinese and Indian firms—trends, motivations and strategy. *Industrial and Corporate Change*, 18(2), 209-221.
7. Banerjee, P., Banerjee, P., De, S., Jindra, J., & Mukhopadhyay, J. (2014). Acquisition pricing in India during 1995–2011: have Indian acquirers really beaten the odds? *Journal of Banking & Finance*, 38(1), 14-30.
8. Barbopoulos, L., Paudyal, K., & Pescetto, G. (2012). Legal systems and gains from cross-border acquisitions. *Journal of Business Research*, 65(9), 1301-1312.
9. Beardsley, S. C., & Farrell, D. (2005). Regulation that's good for competition. *The McKinsey Quarterly*, 2, 49-59.
10. Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2001). Law, politics, and finance. Retrieved from <http://dev3.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/5/567/papers/levines.pdf> (accessed 1 December 2013).
11. Becker, J., & Fuest, C. (2010). Taxing foreign profits with international mergers and acquisitions. *International Economic Review*, 51(1), 171-186.
12. Bhattacharjea, A. (2008). India's new competition law: a comparative assessment. *Journal of Competition Law and Economics*, 4(3), 609-638.
13. Bhaumik, S. K., & Selarka, E. (2012). Does ownership concentration improve M&A outcomes in emerging markets? Evidence from India. *Journal of Corporate Finance*, 18(4), 717-726.
14. Bloomberg. (2014). Spinoffs could set stage for next merger wave: real M&A. October 15. Retrieved from <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-14/spinoffs-could-set-stage-for-next-merger-wave-real-m-a.html> (accessed 29 October 2014).
15. Bris, A., Brisley, N., & Cabolis, C. (2008). Adopting better corporate governance: evidence from cross-border mergers. *Journal of Corporate Finance*, 14(3), 224-240.
16. Byington, J. R., & McGee, J. A. (2010). White-collar crime: a due diligence issue in India. *Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance*, 21(6), 9-15.
17. Cheng, H. F., Gutierrez, M., Mahajan, A., Shachmurove, Y., & Shahrokhi, M. (2007). A future global economy to be built by BRICs. *Global Finance Journal*, 18(2), 143-156.
18. Czinkota, M. R., & Skuba, C. J. (2014). Contextual analysis of legal systems and their impact on trade and foreign direct investment. *Journal of Business Research*, 67(10), 2207-2211.





19. Dhanaraj, C., & Khanna, T. (2011). Transforming mental models on emerging markets. *Academy of Management Learning & Education*, 10(4), 684-701.
20. (The) Economic Times. (2014a). Competition Commission of India tightens rules to see through mergers and acquisition structures. April 2. Retrieved from [http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-04-02/news/48801339\\_1\\_competition-commission-transaction-vinod-dhall](http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-04-02/news/48801339_1_competition-commission-transaction-vinod-dhall) (accessed 2 April 2014).
21. (The) Economic Times. (2014b). India's M&A deal stands at \$32.6 billion during January-August: Grant Thornton. September 18. Retrieved from [http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-09-18/news/54067999\\_1\\_ma-deal-cross-border-deals-equity-deal-activity](http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-09-18/news/54067999_1_ma-deal-cross-border-deals-equity-deal-activity) (accessed 29 October 2014).
22. Erel, I., Liao, R. C., & Weisbach, M. S. (2012). Determinants of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. *Journal of Finance*, 67(3), 1045-1082.
23. Ezeoha, A. E., & Ogamba, E. (2010). Corporate tax shield or fraud? Insight from Nigeria. *International Journal of Law and Management*, 52(1), 5-20.
24. Feito-Ruiz, I., & Menéndez-Requejo, S. (2011). Cross-border mergers and acquisitions in different legal environments. *International Review of Law and Economics*, 31(3), 169-187.
25. Financial Times. (2014). Identifying problems before they occur is key when advising on complex M&A deals. June 11. Retrieved from <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/c49192b2-e733-11e3-88be-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3HL1sgLfx> (accessed 27 January 2014).
26. Georgieva, D., & Jandik, T. (2012). Alternative paths of convergence toward U.S. market and legal regulations: cross-listing vs. merging with U.S. bidders. *Journal of Multinational Financial Management*, 22(5), 230-251.
27. Hao, G. Q., & Howe, J. S. (2011). Does merger structure matter? *Managerial Finance*, 37(12), 1112-1136.
28. Hohler, K. (2013). The introduction of the exemption system for foreign profits and its effects on international acquisitions—the UK and Japan regaining international tax competitiveness? *Journal of Applied Accounting Research*, 14(3), 224-247.
29. Huizinga, H., & Voget, J. (2009). International taxation and the direction and volume of cross-border M&As. *Journal of Finance*, 64(3), 1217-1249.
30. India Today. (2012). Document shows Chidambaram delayed Aircel-Maxis deal by 7 months. May 8. Retrieved from <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/document-shows-chidambaram-delayed-aircel-maxis-deal/1/187868.html> (accessed 6 February 2014).
31. Isa, K. (2014). Tax complexities in the Malaysian corporate tax system: minimize to maximize. *International Journal of Law and Management*, 56(1), 50-65.
32. Jain, A. (2012). Extra-territorial jurisdiction of Competition Commission of India. *Journal of Financial Crime*, 19(1), 112-119.
33. Kanekal, N., & Ganz, K. (2012). Vodafone-Hutch deal: retrospective change to I-T Act. Retrieved from <http://www.livemint.com/2012/03/16143015/VodafoneHutch-deal--Retrospe.html> (accessed 16 September 2012).



34. Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. G. (2000). Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An analysis of diversified Indian business groups. *Journal of Finance*, 55(2), 867-891.
35. Kim, D.-H., & Trumbore, P. F. (2010). Transnational mergers and acquisitions: the impact of FDI on human rights, 1981-2006. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(6), 723-734.
36. Kim, E. H., & Lu, Y. (2013). Corporate governance reforms around the world and cross-border acquisitions. Retrieved from <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2265263> (accessed 3 December 2013).
37. KPMG. (2012). What's news in tax: investing in India—the new frontier. Retrieved from <http://www.kpmg.com/KY/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/PublishingImages/india-new-taxation-regime.pdf> (accessed 14 December 2012).
38. Kumar, N. (2009). How emerging giants are rewriting the rules of M&A. *Harvard Business Review*, 87(5), 115-121.
39. Licht, A. N., Goldschmidt, C., & Schwartz, S. H. (2005). Culture, law, and corporate governance. *International Review of Law and Economics*, 25(2), 229-255.
40. McConnell, L. J. (2014). Establishing liability for multinational corporations: lessons from Akpan. *International Journal of Law and Management*, 56(2), 88-104.
41. Meyer, K. E., Estrin, S., Bhaumik, S. K., & Peng, M. W. (2009). Institutions, resources, and entry strategies in emerging economies. *Strategic Management Journal*, 30(1), 61-80.
42. MSN. (2013). 29 years later, Bhopal gas victims still wait for justice. December 2. Retrieved from <http://news.in.msn.com/national/29-years-later-bhopal-gas-victims-still-wait-for-justice> (accessed 4 December 2013).
43. Nagano, M., & Yuan, Y. (2013). Cross-border acquisitions in a transition economy: the recent experiences of China and India. *Journal of Asian Economics*, 24(1), 66-79.
44. Nangia, V. K., Agarawal, R., Sharma, V., & Reddy, K. S. (2011). Conglomerate diversification through cross-continent acquisition: Vedanta weds Cairn India. *Emerald Emerging Markets Case Studies*, 1(1), 1-15.
45. Nayyar, D. (2008). The Internationalization of firms from India: investment, mergers and acquisitions. *Oxford Development Studies*, 36(1), 111-131.
46. North, D. C. (1990). *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*. Cambridge University Press.
47. OECD. (2009). *Globalization and emerging economies*. Policy Brief, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Retrieved from <http://www.oecd.org/regional/searf2009/42576801.pdf> (accessed 5 May 2011).
48. Pandey, A. (2012). Policy makers need to revisit prudent approach of the 90s. *The Financial Express*, June 1, p. 12.
49. Ramello, G. B., & Voigt, S. (2012). Introduction: the economics of efficiency and the judicial system. *International Review of Law and Economics*, 32(1), 1-2.
50. Ray, K. G. (2010). *Mergers and Acquisition – Strategy, Valuation and Integration*. PHI Learning.
51. Reddy, K. S., Nangia, V. K., & Agarawal, R. (2011). Review, rewriting and impact of Indian takeover code. *International Journal of Law and Management*, 53(4), 241-251.



52. Reddy, K. S., Nangia, V. K., & Agrawal, R. (2012). Mysterious broken cross-country M&A deal: Bharti Airtel-MTN. *Journal of the International Academy for Case Studies*, 18(7), 61-75.
53. Reddy, K. S., Nangia, V. K., & Agrawal, R. (2013). Indian economic-policy reforms, bank mergers, and lawful proposals: the ex ante and ex post ‘lookup’. *Journal of Policy Modeling*, 35(4), 601-622.
54. Reddy, K. S., Nangia, V. K., & Agrawal, R. (2014a). Farmers Fox theory: does a country's weak regulatory system benefit both the acquirer and the target firm? Evidence from Vodafone-Hutchison deal. *International Strategic Management Review*, 2(1), 56-67.
55. Reddy, K. S., Nangia, V. K., & Agrawal, R. (2014b). The 2007-2008 global financial crisis, and cross-border mergers and acquisitions: a 26-nation exploratory study. *Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies*, 6(3), 257-281.
56. Reis, N. R., Ferreira, M. P., & Santos, J. C. (2013). Institutional distance and cross-border mergers and acquisitions completion: a conceptual framework. Retrieved from <http://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/iibc2013/4.2.pdf> (accessed 11 December 2013).
57. Sansom, M., & Christian, P. (2010). India's new competition regime: the elephant who became a tiger. *Journal of European Competition Law and Practice*, 1(1), 62-65.
58. Schöllhammer, H., & Nigh, D. (1984). The effect of political events on foreign direct investments by German multinational corporations. *Management International Review*, 24(1), 18-40.
59. Schöllhammer, H., & Nigh, D. (1986). The effect of political events on Japanese foreign direct investments. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 3(3), 133-156.
60. Scott, C. D. (2015). Lobbying: a critical dimension of business strategy. *International Journal of Law and Management*, 57(1), 17-27.
61. Serdar Dinc, I., & Erel, I. (2013). Economic nationalism in mergers and acquisitions. *Journal of Finance*, 68(6), 2471-2514.
62. Shroff, R., & Ambast, A. (2013). Ss. 5 and 6 of the Competition Act, 2002: demystifying the competition implications of mergers and acquisitions in India. *Journal of Financial Crime*, 20(1), 88-115.
63. Tan, H. B., & Hooy, C. W. (2003). Bank merger and bank stock volatility: a post-announcement analysis. *Managerial Finance*, 30(4), 29-47.
64. Varma, S. (2011). Born global acquirers from Indian IT: an exploratory case study. *International Journal of Emerging Markets*, 6(4), 351-368.
65. World Bank. (2014). *Doing Business 2015: Going Beyond Efficiency*. World Bank.
66. Zhang, J., & He, X. (2014). Economic nationalism and foreign acquisition completion: the case of China. *International Business Review*, 23(1), 212-227.
67. Zhang, J., Zhou, C., & Ebbers, H. (2011). Completion of Chinese overseas acquisitions: institutional perspectives and evidence. *International Business Review*, 20(2), 226-238.