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**PAKISTANI BUREAUCRACY IN AYUB ERA AND THE 1973 REFORMS**

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In one of his earliest books, the Harvard political scientist Samuel P. Huntington viewed the state of affairs of bureaucracy among the developing nations as an important source of progress, advancement and a medium of change (Huntington, 1967). Huntington then went to shower great praises on Pakistani bureaucracy as the archetype of his categorization and praised its central role in ensuring miraculous economic development and promoting political stability - it was thus believed that it successfully fulfilled the role of translating political decisions admirably onto the executable plane (Weber, 1948; Huntington, 1967). Bureaucracy is essential to the workings of any government, Pakistani or otherwise. It is recognized both by its opponents and by proponents as fulfilling a central role in the affairs of a nation-state. Albeit following Riggs, we may construe bureaucracy in developing countries as working essentially in the cultural milieu of a nation-state, with its focus on socioeconomic progress, that is believed to be an agreed upon agenda for all modern nation-states. Riggs (1963:122) argues that effective and responsible bureaucracy is not possible without administrative reforms. In a traditional sense, however, the bureaucracy has been expected to guarantee that there is a continuum in political dynamics and order and cohesion is addressed through its endeavors.

The present paper is an attempt to conceptualize and analyze the workings of Pakistani bureaucracy during the Ayub era when Pakistan had one of the highest rates of industrialization and one of the fastest growth rates of GNP per capita in the world. It will conclude with the introduction of an overview of systemic reforms introduced and promulgated by the Bhutto regime during the year 1973, and that how egalitarian and meritocratic the bureaucracy has become since then.

**PAKISTANI BUREAUCRACY AND THE PRE-AYUB KHAN ERA:**

At the time Pakistan came into existence, it had an insignificant team of bureaucracy, which has increased rapidly during the last six decades. At present, the number of the civil servants has exceeded half a million. A major portion of these servants, that is ninety percent, is comprised of employees in grades 1-15. The rest of ten percent civil servants are those having grades 16 to 22. From this ten percent civil servants, the share of the Central Superior Services (CSS) is only five percent. These civil servants are the ones who would - due to their status, power, and authority - will be the subject of this historical paper. The workings of this group, most notably, apart from other political institutions, have been inherited largely from the colonial past of the British, and in popular imagination, that has meant simply an extension of the Raj. Robert Heussler (as quoted in Mavis Puthuchery, 1978) observes that the administrators in the colonial states are not the public servants as they are supposed to be. This, according to him refers that they were not civil servants of governments coming into power through elections of appointment and whose high-profile officers get a large share in the authority and power to be exercised. The way they exercised their authority made them appear as the rulers. These high-rank officers were not large in number. However, using their intelligence, personal competence and strong administrative skills enjoyed a lot of control in the exercise of power in the government.

In August 1947 when the British left India after its partition, the two countries that is India and Pakistan inherited an effective system of civil service that was considered as one of the advanced administrative systems in the world (see table 1.1).

**Table: 1.1**

<b>THE STRUCTURE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AT THE TIME OF INDEPENDENCE IN 1947</b>			
I	Indian Civil Service	VI	Indian Veterinary Services
II	Indian Education Services	VII	Indian Medical Services (Civil)
III	Indian Police Service	VIII	Indian Forest Services
IV	Indian Forest Engineering	IX	Indian Agricultural Services
V	Indian Service of Engineers	X	Indian General Service

CENTRAL SERVICES (CLASS I ONLY)			
I	Indian Audit and Account	VII	Central Engineering Service
II	Imperial Custom Service	VIII	Superior Telegraph/Wireless Bra.
III	Indian Posts/telegraph Dept	IX	Archaeological Department
IV	Zoological Survey of India	X	Indian Ecclesiastical Department
V	Political Department	XI	Medical Research Department
VI	Central Revenue Chemical Service	XII	Mercantile Marine/Trading Ship Service
CENTRAL SERVICES (CLASS I & II)			
I	Geological Service Class-I	IV	Geological survey of India Class-II
II	Imperial Secretariat Service	V	General Central Service
III	Income Tax Department	VI	Mines Department
CENTRAL SERVICES (CLASS II ONLY)			
I	Imperial Secretariat Stenographers Services	VII	Imperial Secretariat Reporter Council Services
II	Telegraph Eng. Wireless Serv	VIII	Postmaster Service
III	Postal Superintendents Serv	IX	Telegraph Traffic Service
IV	Military Assistant Surgeon	X	Northern India salt Revenue Serv
V	Custom Appraisers Service	XI	Custom Preventive Service
VI	Assistant Accounts/Audit S.	XII	Bengal Pilot Service
Sources: Developed from Government of Pakistan, Report of Pay commission, (AMGGPP, Karachi, 1949) (known as the Muneer Commission Report, 1949), and Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal, Rules), (MPCPP, Islamabad, 1972)			

An overview of the last 60 years of Pakistan's history would expose the fact that reforms (euphemistically termed) in the civil services have been very frequent, compared to the quick succession of different civil governments. Both military and civil regimes have, nevertheless, tried to reformulate and restructure the bureaucratic institutions in line with their preconceptions so that the popular expectations could be appeased, and of course that their political control over the bureaucracy increases, rather than to the contrary. Therefore, most regimes have pursued the

policies of purges and reforms as instruments to change the behavioral outlook of the services, and most often, both of them have been performed in conjunction. Naturally, Ayub Khan's reforms were accompanied by full-fledged purges in the Civil Services of Pakistan, which was again followed up the Commission created under the supervision of Chief Justice Cornelius in his Pay Services and Reform Constitution of 1962. General Yahya again removed more than 300 officers, which was succeeded by Bhutto's 1973 Administrative Reforms. This necessarily politicized the bureaucratic structure in Pakistan, and tended to shook the confidence of the bureaucracy.

#### **AYUB KHAN'S REGIME AND THE CSP (1958-1971):**

The first declared martial law take over in Pakistan was by General Ayub Khan in the year 1958, as military exercised its enormous might to seize the political power. Of the many causal factors (in both public opinion and the military justification) for the political instability and constant reformation of different governments, bureaucracy was perceived to have played an important. It was believed that bureaucracy as a group of privileged employee have altogether altered the political landscape of Pakistan, simply for their own political benefit (Braibanti, 1966). Thus, as the military regime was installed under General Ayub Khan, it had both the political will and the power to restructure bureaucracy according to its own dictates. The administrative reforms introduced by Ayub was dictated by political objectives and therefore his period (1958-1969) is described as politics of control over representative institutions (Baloch, 2004:47). During the initial period of independence, the bureaucracy, the Civil service of Pakistan, was thought of to have its role in developing about a political imbalance and keeping the politicians under the pressure of its administrative potentials to enjoy a considerable share in the power. This was a multilayered process. First, there was a 'soft re-positioning' strategy: several of army officers were assigned important administrative positions in the civil service. Secondly, there was an introduction of the 'hard re-positing' strategy: in the late 1950s, about more than a dozen CSP officers were thought to have indulged in venal practices and were forcible removed from their jobs —signifying the fact that the bureaucracy was no longer invincible or even permanent. This naturally awoke the bureaucracy to the urgency of matters and they were roused from their dogmatic slumbers (Burki, 1969). The overall impact of these strategies was that the military regime was viewed as enormously dedicated to restructuring the bureaucracy, and that's a death knell was sounded entailing that it meant business from now. The government appointed a Pay and Service Commission in August 1959. This Commission was led by Justice A. R. Cornelius the then Chief Justice of the

Supreme Court of Pakistan. Justice Cornelius was known for viewing the bureaucracy as a stagnant, vain, power-hungry group of privileged people. In his famous report, he strongly criticized the generalist nature of CSP and its preponderance over other services (Cornelius Report (Commission 1962).

The report had far reaching impact on reforming the bureaucracy though the earlier reports of Egger Commission 1953 and the Gladieux Commission 1955 failed to produce any meaningful change in the bureaucratic structure of Pakistan.

**Table: 1.2**

<b>THE SEVEN-TIER STRUCTURE OF THE PUBLIC SERVICES</b>			
<b>S. #</b>	<b>GROUP</b>	<b>GRADES</b>	<b>NATURE OF JOB</b>
I	Group F	4 Grades	Unskilled Workers
II	Group E	4 Grades	Semi-skilled Workers
III	Group D	5 Grades	Skilled workers and rank and file, supervisory staff
IV	Group C	5 Grades	Lower inspectorial and Middle supervisory staff
V	Group B	4 Grades	'Basic Officer' Class
VI	Group A	4 Grades	Managerial Class; District up to Divisional level
VII	P A S	4 Grades	Top directly and higher Administrative posts

Source: Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat, Report of the Pay and Services Commission, 1959-62, A. R. Cornelius, Chairman, MPCPP, Karachi, 1969, (known as the Cornelius Commission Report, 1969)

This, therefore, entailed that a restriction was in preparation that would curtail the fundamental and enormous powers of the CSP as a group. Be as it may, the CSP showed great pragmatism, flexibility and openness as it bowed its head and endeavored to develop a positive relationship with the military rulers. This elite CSP also compromised in the creation of an Economic Pool composing of high level positions in the Ministry of Finance, Commerce and Economics, that would have a 40 percent pool for the non-CSP officers.

As the regime focused its attention to development programs and economic progress along with the process of industrialization, bureaucracy in its traditional role as simply a watchman and a creator of order became obsolete. Its role was also perceived from thence onwards to ensure and facilitate development projects: in view of the varying demands of the country, a division was created. This division afforded training to the incoming and present officers associated with the areas of economics, public administration, community development, finance, accounting, etc. (Burki, 1969). As a cumulative process, this not only meant that a broader view of bureaucracy was at work and implemented, but also that a young and vibrant cadre of civil services was available that was trained according to the new imperatives of the time.

Therefore, this bureaucracy very eagerly supported two programs of military regime: Basic Democracies and Rural Development Program. Both these programs were very conducive in rehabilitating the reputation of the CSP officers, who served there. It also meant an involvement of the CSP officers with the broader segment of the populace as well as the local political leadership. Accordingly, this enabled the district officer to accomplish - though to a minimal extent - community development and welfare. On the other hand, powerful politicians viewed them as a counterbalance to their own position in the rural areas, believing them to be local manipulators and compradors bent on extending the influence and the will of the military regime.

In short, by tolerating the introduction of military officers in their cadres and the redesigning their training courses and strategies and by way of keenly supporting the basic policies of Ayub Khan's regime, the bureaucracy compromise with its position. The net benefit to bureaucracy was that it weathered the storm and maintained and preserved its elite status during the intervening period. It also very skillfully resisted other onslaughts of the military regime, but with the fall of Ayub Khan the bureaucracy again got its reputation tarnished, as it was believed to be the main support of the military regime, and its handmaiden throughout the period.

**BHUTTO REGIME AND THE 1973 REFORMS:**

With the disintegration of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh out of East Pakistan, the bureaucracy had a fresh item on its 'crimes committed list': the primary cause of the breakup of the country. Three factors, therefore stand out when we are to analyze these reforms in a historical context.

First, there was an increase in the political activism of the student body that started in 1965. Leading in a single year to the resignation of Ayub Khan as the head of state in 1969. It was structured, behavior, and the domineering attitude of the CSP which was also questioned bitterly, and criticized from four quarters. This sort of anti-bureaucraticpropaganda became a regular theme of the print media and political speeches.

Second, as a result of the military clash between Pakistan and India, Pakistan disintegrated to turn East Pakistan into Bangladesh. This setback also placed the bureaucracy into a very awkward position because it was also viewed as the prime causing triggering differences. Naturally, a number of Bengali CSP officers at the top level, opted to go to Bangladesh. In a nutshell, it was believed and portrayed throughout the media that it was the faulty policies of the CSP, the bureaucracy, that caused disintegration of the country.

Third, the political scenario of the 1970s and finally the electoral victory of Bhutto in West Pakistan had anti-Ayubism and the concomitant venal practices of bureaucracy as its rallying cry. Naturally, the slogan was translated into reality as Bhutto took over power. It is interesting to note that Bhutto referred to the CSP officers in his private discussion in not so good terms: Baday Sahib, Jeehuzorm, Aaqa, Nokershahi, Brahmins, Sahab Loag etc. (Ironically, Bhutto himself wanted his daughter to join the Foreign Services!)

**1973 REFORMS AND THEIR IMPACT:**

The 1973 Reforms, born at the same time as the introduction of the Pakistani constitution, we're ambitious and hence never fully implemented. Nonetheless, they substantiallyimpacted the bureaucratic structure of Pakistan. In addition, this had an effect on the conduct, status and the attitude of the civil servants of Pakistan.In his address to the nation Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto announced Administrative Reforms in the Civil Service of Pakistan as revolutionary (Government of Pakistan, Administrative Reforms

Cell, Prime Minister's Address to the Nation on August 20, 1973, "Implementation of Administrative Reforms", Islamabad: Establishment Division, 1975). The totality of these reforms is as follows:

First, the Civil Service of Pakistan was obliterated. The members of the Civil Service were divided into newly formulated groups – the District Management Group, the Tribal Management Group and the Secretariat Group. (It must be noted that several years later in 1981, the two groups, i.e. the District Management Group and the Tribal Management Group were merged to form one group. Besides, the conventional exercise of keeping fixed posts in the top secretariat of CSP officers was also abolished. This also ended the distinction between CSP, PSP, and others to create an All Pakistan Unified Group. Third, an Accounts Group was formed from various groups like Pakistan Audit and Accounts (PAAS), Pakistan Military Accounts (PMAS), Pakistan Railway Accounts (PRAS).

The 1973 reforms substantially reformed the bureaucracy to a greater extent, but reformation is not an event, but a process and must be viewed as such. These have considerably changed the landscape and have tended to bring about transparency, and the notion of equality between the different sectors of the public services and among the various governmental departments. The impact of these reforms was aimed at turning the scope of the federal services wider, accommodative, more competent, and creating a genuine uniformity culminating into equality of all CSS services.

Another interesting thing is to note here that the 1973 reforms also opened the Civil Services to women, except for a few departments (Police Service still remains one!). This did not mean that a quota was established, rather that women had to compete on an equal and competitive basis. However, the equality that was to be established within the bureaucracy is still too distant as most candidates and public imagination view the DMG as the real power wielder.

Another introduction was the Common Training Program (CTP) that changed the structure of the bureaucracy. The new changes related to openness, competitiveness and equality. The toll was however taken that it reduced the exclusivity of the training and reservation of posts, or even the differentiation of pay scales.

It is an unfortunate fact that the reforms of 1973 remained ineffective in terms of bringing about any variation in the bureaucratic structure, mindset and conduct because this bureaucracy continued to lack transparency and discretion. (World Bank: 1998).

**CONCLUSION:**

The reforms that have been pouring in since the early 1950s have tried to reformulate the bureaucracy according to the needs of the future and the continuous re-description of the bureaucratic role in the contemporary world. It should, however, be kept in mind that reform must be viewed as a process rather than a simple event. The reforms and changes that were introduced during the Ayub and Bhutto regimes had both their loopholes and strong points. The need of the time, then and now, is to identify the shortcomings and to restructure them accordingly, and so on and so forth. Presently, this would mean a broader job description for the officer, a more competitive mode of examination that it is relatively open, free, transparent, and non-discriminatory. And, on the structural level, this would entail a de-politicization of the bureaucracy and the creation of the 'dichotomy between politics and administration'.

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